Balwant Singh

Maharaja Balwant Singh (c. 1711–1770) was the founder and first independent ruler of the Benares State (Kashi Raj), and is regarded as one of the most accomplished regional rulers of eighteenth-century northern India.

Balwant Singh belonged to the Narayan dynasty. He was the son of Mansaram Singh, who had established himself as a prominent zamindar in Benares. Mansaram Singh was the son of Manoranjan Singh, a zamindar of Banaras region and resident of Gangapur village. Upon Mansaram Singh's death in 1738, Balwant Singh succeeded him as Raja of Kaswar. During the course of his reign, he expanded his authority and was later recognized as the Maharaja of Benares, becoming the founder of the semi-independent Benares State.

Rising to power during the decline of the Mughal Empire, he transformed Benares from a zamindari under the Nawabs of Awadh into a powerful and semi-autonomous principality. Through a combination of military ability, political foresight, and administrative reform, he consolidated his authority over Benares and the surrounding districts, laying the foundations of a dynasty that continued to rule the region for generations.

Balwant Singh's reign coincided with one of the most turbulent periods in Indian history, marked by the collapse of centralized Mughal authority and the rise of competing powers, including the Nawabs of Awadh and Bengal, the Marathas, and the English East India Company. Rather than relying solely on military force, he pursued a cautious and pragmatic foreign policy, skillfully balancing relations with these rival powers while safeguarding the interests of his state. This this the reason he was called as the Shivaji of North India. His diplomacy during the conflicts leading up to and following the Battle of Buxar (1764) enabled Benares to emerge from a period of political uncertainty with its autonomy largely intact.

At home, Balwant Singh strengthened the administration and economy of his kingdom, promoted agriculture and revenue collection, and encouraged the prosperity of Benares, one of India's foremost religious and commercial centres. He also patronized temples, religious institutions, and public works, reinforcing the city's importance as a centre of Hindu pilgrimage and learning. His rule brought a degree of stability to the region at a time when much of northern India was affected by continuous warfare and political upheaval.

Remembered for his political acumen, resilience, and statecraft, Balwant Singh successfully preserved the identity and territorial integrity of Benares during an era of rapid imperial change. His achievements established the Benares Raj as one of the most significant princely houses in northern India and ensured that his legacy endured long after his death. He is widely regarded as the architect of the modern Benares State and one of the most influential rulers in the history of eastern Uttar Pradesh.

Balwant Singh rose to prominence as a key figure in 18th-century India through a combination of military strength, diplomatic skill, and strategic acumen. Rather than becoming a subordinate of the East India Company, he secured the status of an esteemed ally. As noted by historian S. Sanyal:

"Thus, Balwant Singh, by dint of his superior act, diplomacy and strength came to enjoy the status of an esteemed ally and not that of a servile subordinate to the East India Company and stood as a bulwark of the Bengal Presidency against possible inroads from the western and central India."

Early Life

Balwant Singh was born around 1711 into a Bhumihar Brahmin family that had established itself as influential zamindars in the Benares region. He was the eldest son of Mansaram Singh, who rose from a local zamindar to become the de facto ruler of the Benares state.

Little is known about Balwant Singh's childhood or formal education. Growing up during a period of political instability marked by the decline of the Mughal Empire and the increasing autonomy of regional rulers, he was exposed to the administration of landed estates, military affairs, and court politics from an early age. As the heir to Mansaram Singh, he likely assisted his father in managing the family's expanding territories and maintaining relations with the Mughal authorities and the Nawabs of Awadh.

Early Administration and Expansion

Balwant Singh emerged as the founder of the Benares Raj's political power during the declining years of the Mughal Empire. His rise was closely connected to the administrative abilities of his father, Mansa Ram, a Bhumihar mansabdar who served as the revenue manager under Rustam Ali Khan, the lessee of the sarkars of Benares, Jaunpur, Ghazipur and Chunar. Impressed by Mansa Ram's efficiency, Rustam Ali Khan secured for him the title of Raja Bahadur from the Mughal emperor Muhammad Shah. Mansa Ram, however, declined the distinction and requested that it instead be conferred upon his son, Balwant Singh.

In 1728, when Saadat Khan, the Nawab of Awadh, obtained the lease of the eastern sarkars from Murtaza Khan, Mansa Ram continued to administer them on behalf of Rustam Ali Khan. Following Rustam Ali Khan's political decline, Mansa Ram succeeded in obtaining for Balwant Singh the lease of the sarkars of Benares, Jaunpur and Chunar on an annual revenue of thirteen lakh rupees. The Kotwali and Mint of Benares, along with the fort of Jaunpur, remained outside his jurisdiction, while Ghazipur was assigned to another official named Shaikh Abdullah. Consequently, on 9 June 1738, Balwant Singh became the hereditary lessee (lessee de jure) of the sarkars of Benares, Jaunpur and Mirzapur.

Following Mansa Ram's death, Balwant Singh secured direct imperial recognition through a sanad issued under the seal of the Mughal wazir Qamruddin Khan, with the support of Amir Khan, the governor of Allahabad. The sanad conferred upon him the title of Raja and confirmed his lease over the sarkar of Benares and three additional parganas at an annual tribute of thirteen lakh rupees. On this occasion, Balwant Singh presented a nazrana of ₹21,775 to Emperor Muhammad Shah.

Balwant Singh soon demonstrated considerable administrative and political ability. Determined to establish an independent political position, he selected Titharia as his seat of power, renamed it Gangapore, and constructed a mud fort there. Although he continued to acknowledge his Mughal and Awadhi suzerains by making regular revenue payments, he consistently exploited periods of political instability to strengthen his authority. During the absence of Nawab Safdar Jang from Awadh, he withheld revenue payments, expelled the Nawab's sazawal (revenue officer) from Benares, and expanded his influence by raiding neighbouring territories. Around the end of 1749, he captured the fort of Bhadohi from the Rajput zamindar Duswant Singh. When Muhammad Quli Khan, the deputy governor of Allahabad, marched against him with a large force, Balwant Singh decisively defeated the expedition near Bhadohi in mid-1750, greatly enhancing his prestige and military reputation.

The wider political crisis caused by the Bangash Pathans of Farrukhabad further strengthened Balwant Singh's position. After Ahmad Khan Bangash defeated Safdar Jang in 1750, Even before reaching Allahabad, Ahmad Khan had already appointed Muhammad Amir Khan, one of his stepbrothers, as the faujdar (military governor) of Ghazipore, and Sahib Zaman Khan, a cavalry commander serving Balwant Singh, as governor of Jaunpur, Benares, and Chunargarh. Sahib Zaman Khan was entrusted with the responsibility of removing Safdar Jang's officials from these districts and establishing Bangash authority.

Meanwhile, Fazl Ali Khan, the imperial faujdar of Ghazipore, fled upon learning of the advancing Bangash army, effectively abandoning the district without resistance. However, Balwant Singh refused to surrender his territories. Rather than submitting, he sought to organize resistance against the Bangash advance. Balwant Singh defeated Amir Khan in the battle of Zamania and the Afghan faujdar was put to flight. Zaman Khan found that it was an ardous task to dispossess the turbulent Raja of his possesisons and prayed to Ahmad Khan Bangash to provide further military reinforcement. Ahmad Khan responded by sending the same Sahib Zaman Khan and instructing Akbar Shah, the chief of Azamgarh, and Shamshad Khan, the zamindar of Mahaul, to assist him.

The combined Bangash force became formidable, numbering approximately 1,700 cavalry and 10,000 infantry. With these reinforcements, Sahib Zaman Khan successfully captured the strategically important fort of Surharpore after a short siege of 15 days. This victory marked another significant setback for Balwant Singh and demonstrated the military strength of the Bangash coalition. After the recent success, they established the headquarters at Nizamabad, about 32 miles north-east of Jaunpur. At the same time, Balwant Singh moved to Murahoo, where he organized a defensive camp in preparation for confronting Sahib Zaman Khan's forces.

The strategic situation soon became even more critical. Ahmad Khan Bangash himself arrived at Allahabad and laid siege to the fort. This development placed Benares under the immediate threat of invasion and conquest. With the Bangash army advancing from one direction and Allahabad under siege, the region faced the prospect of a severe military and political catastrophe. Contemporary accounts describe widespread panic among the population, reflecting the seriousness of the Bangash offensive and the precarious position of Balwant Singh's administration.

Rather than relying solely on military confrontation, Balwant Singh employed diplomacy and financial inducements to safeguard his territories. He sent trusted officers carrying expensive gifts to Ahmad Khan Bangash and succeeded in winning over several Rohilla chiefs through heavy bribes. He subsequently met Ahmad Khan at Allahabad, presenting him with a nazrana of one lakh rupees. In return, Ahmad Khan permitted Balwant Singh to retain all territories south of the Ganges and invited him to participate in the siege of Allahabad from the direction of Arail.

The Afghan ascendancy proved short-lived. Before the arrangement could be fully implemented, Balwant Singh expelled Sahib Zaman Khan from Jaunpur and by April 1751 had recovered all his former possessions. However, the restoration of Safdar Jang's authority created a new challenge. Determined to punish those who had sided with his enemies, Safdar Jang marched through Jaunpur into Benares, plundered Gangapore, and dispatched forces across the Ganges to suppress Balwant Singh. Faced with overwhelming odds, Balwant Singh attempted reconciliation by sending his trusted officer Lal Khan with a gift of two lakh rupees and an offer to increase his annual tribute by an additional two lakh rupees. Although initially encouraged to present himself before the Nawab, he declined to do so. Political developments at the Mughal court soon compelled Safdar Jang to abandon the campaign. At the end of March 1752, the Nawab concluded peace with Balwant Singh, confirmed him in possession of his territories through a khilat, fixed his annual revenue at fifteen lakh rupees, and appointed Syed Nurul Hasan Khan Bilgrami as sazawal to supervise revenue payments.

Following this settlement, Balwant Singh concentrated on consolidating his authority. Taking advantage of the continued difficulties faced by his suzerain between 1752 and 1754, he strengthened his position further by transferring his capital from Gangapore to Ramnagar on the southern bank of the Ganges, where he constructed a substantial stone fort. He also began planning the incorporation of the fertile belt surrounding Benares, bounded by the Ganges in the north, the Karamnasa River in the east, the Son River and the Kaimur Hills in the south, thereby laying the territorial foundations of the Benares Raj.

Following the transfer of his capital to Ramnagar, Balwant Singh embarked upon an ambitious programme of territorial expansion designed to transform the Benares Raj into a cohesive regional power. His immediate objective was the strategically important hill fortress of Bijaygarh, but before attempting its conquest he systematically subdued the intermediate strongholds controlled by local chiefs.

In early 1753, Balwant Singh captured the fort of Patita in the pargana of Bhagwant by exploiting the advanced age of its governor, Jayaait Khan, and launching a sudden attack. Shortly afterwards, he turned against the formidable stone fort of Latifpur in the Kupsa Hills. Taking advantage of a succession dispute following the death of its ruler, Malik Farrukh, Balwant Singh invaded Ahraura, where Malik Ahmad, son of Malik Farrukh, was killed while attempting to escape. Malik Ehsan, other son, abandoned Latifpur, enabling Balwant Singh's forces to occupy both the fort and its surrounding territory with little resistance. Having secured these approaches, Balwant Singh directed his attention towards Bijaygarh. Unable to withstand his advance, Vijay Singh, a Chandel rajput governor of the fortress, negotiated its surrender in December 1753 in return for a payment of ₹50,000. Early in 1754, Balwant Singh captured the neighbouring fort of Agore, controlled by Chandel Rajput kinsmen of Vijay Singh, on the banks of the Son River, extending the southern frontier of the Benares Raj into the forested and hilly tracts bordering the Son valley.

These military successes alarmed Nawab Safdar Jang, who marched to Benares in February 1754 to suppress the increasingly independent Raja. Balwant Singh avoided direct confrontation by crossing the Ganges and taking refuge at Chandrauti, east of Benares. Before decisive action could be taken, however, Safdar Jang was compelled by political developments elsewhere to abandon the campaign, allowing Balwant Singh to retain his gains.

Balwant Singh subsequently consolidated his eastern frontier. In 1754 he intervened in a dispute between his uncle Dasa Ram and Daim Khan, a Gaharwar Rajput convert zamindar of Keyra Mangror in Shahabad Sarkar, eventually bringing the estate under his authority. To legitimize the acquisition, he obtained official recognition from Raja Jankiram, the Naib Subahdar of Patna, agreeing to pay an annual tribute of ₹7,000. He further strengthened his claim by securing a rent-free imperial grant (madad-i-ma'ash) of the entire pargana from Emperor Alamgir II, which was later reaffirmed by Emperor Shah Alam II.

His administrative expansion continued in 1755 when he extended direct control over the sarkar of Jaunpur, reducing the autonomy of many lesser zamindars by placing their estates under the supervision of his own officials. He then moved against Himmat Bahadur, a Naga Goswami Brahmin the zamindar of Garwara and a veteran of the Battle of Panipat III, and Shaikh Kabul Muhammad of Machhlishahr, both of whom had earlier supported Sahib Zaman Khan during the Afghan occupation. Using the expulsion of one of Himmat Bahadur's retainers as a pretext, Balwant Singh launched a campaign against Garwara. Himmat Bahadur brutally defeated and fled, leaving the fort to Balwant Singh's possession, the resistance continued under his son Sukhnandan Singh until Balwant Singh pacified the region by granting Garwara to Budh Singh at an annual revenue assessment of ₹80,000. Later that year he attacked Machhlishahr, treacherously captured Shaikh Kabul Muhammad, and incorporated the zamindari into his dominions.

Emboldened by these repeated successes, Balwant Singh next sought to acquire the strategically vital fortress of Chunar, one of the strongest forts in northern India and the principal military base of the Nawabs of Awadh east of the Ganges. Mirza Ahmed Beg was the killadar of the fort. He left one minor son, named Agha Khale, and the responsibility for management devolved on a slave , called Agha Mir. Following the death of Safdar Jang in 1754 and the resulting instability within Awadh. Balwant Singh was tempted by this situation, he secretly negotiated with the fort's de facto commandant, Agha Mir, offering a bribe of one lakh rupees in exchange for the surrender of Chunar.

The conspiracy was discovered by the new Nawab, Shuja-ud-Daula, who personally marched against Balwant Singh in November 1756. Unable to resist the superior Awadhi forces in the open, Balwant Singh retreated to the strong fortress of Bijaygarh and appealed to the Marathas for assistance. During the campaign, the widow of Bariar Singh, the zamindar of Pindra and Balwant Singh's mother-in-law, mounted a determined defence against the Nawab's forces. The Nawab was struck by the valour of this lady, compelling him to negotiate and save his face. After occupying Chunar, Shuja-ud-Daula appointed a new commandant, he called Mirza Beg's son and treated the young heir with kindness.

After settling the affairs of Chunar, Shuja-ud-daula came to direct his operations against Balwant Singh in December, 1756, and ordered his troops to eject him; but for his strategic advantages, the attempts proved abortive. Balwant Singh took refuge in the strong and secluded fortress of Bijaygarh and sent envoys to the Maratha chiefs for help. Though sane persons acquainted with the Shuja-ud-daula, such as celebrated Shaikh Ali Hazin advised him to patch up his differences with Balwant Singh, the Nawab, in the vanity of his youth, refused to lend his ear to the advice and summoned Fazl Ali Khan, the faujdar of Ghazipore, and told him that he desired him to replace Balwant Singh.

Fazl Ali realised, Balwant Singh was a hard nut to crack and proposed to the Nawab that he could undertake the arduous task of extirpating him, provided he was put in command of a force of ten thousand cavalry at least for a year and was paid ten lacs of rupees in advance for the compensation of likely damages to be sustained by him in a war against the mighty rebel. These exorbitant terms of Fazl Ali set Shuja-ud-daula in a fix. At this juncture, Muhammad Ali Khan, one of his courtiers, gave out that the death of Safdar Jang had released the forces of disorder and suggested that it would be imprudent to augment them by pricking up a quarrel with the Raja of Benares, who, if annoyed, could certainly combine all the forces of destruction and devastation by having recourse to open violence and robbery, the consequences of which might sweep even Fyzabad and destroy all sense of security in Awadh. It was also indicated to Shuja-ud-daula, that it would be next to impossible for anybody to collect the revenue from these districts in opposition to Balwant Singh and would be more so for Fazl Ali Khan who managed to pay the revenue of the sarkar of Ghazipore with great difficulty.

Taking advantage of these divisions, Balwant Singh dispatched his trusted officer Lal Khan to the Nawab with gifts amounting to five lakh rupees and offered to increase his annual tribute by an additional five lakh rupees. Faced with mounting political difficulties, Shuja-ud-Daula accepted the proposal in February 1757. He confirmed Balwant Singh in possession of all his territories and additionally granted him the pargana of Bhadohi as a jagir, effectively recognizing the Raja's authority while avoiding a costly military campaign.

Balwant Singh nevertheless remained determined to eliminate his regional rivals. Angered by Fazl Ali Khan's support for the Nawab, he bribed senior officials in the Awadh administration and launched incursions into Ghazipur. When Fazl Ali attempted to organize resistance, the Awadh government, influenced by officials favourable to Balwant Singh, interpreted his actions as rebellion and dispatched troops against him. Fazl Ali fled to Patna, allowing Balwant Singh to occupy the entire sarkar of Ghazipur. He confiscated the former faujdar's estates and redistributed the twenty-two parganas among his own followers on fixed revenue assignments.

With Ghazipur secured, Balwant Singh consolidated his administration by suppressing refractory taluqdars and neighbouring chiefs. He subdued the Babhandeva, the Hyobunsi Rajput Raja of Ballia, Durg Vijayi Singh, a Ujjainiya Rajput zamindar of Seringal in Chausa, Shahabad, and the Sengar Rajput zamindars of Lakhnesar. In 1759, he brutally defeated Vikramjit, a Gharwar Rajput Raja of Kuntit, from territory administered under the Nazim of Allahabad, further extending the influence of the Benares Raj.

By the time of the Battle of Plassey in 1757, Balwant Singh had transformed what had begun as a revenue lease into a substantial territorial principality through a combination of military conquest, political opportunism, diplomacy, and administrative consolidation. Contemporary observers described his dominions as comprising approximately ninety-six parganas, making him one of the most powerful regional rulers between Awadh and Bengal. As the English East India Company emerged as the dominant power in Bengal after Plassey, Balwant Singh recognized the significance of these developments and sought to establish communication with the new political order, although the Nawab of Awadh remained reluctant to alter his existing policy towards the Raja.

Alliance with Prince Ali Gauhar (1759)

In early 1759, Balwant Singh, in coordination with Mahammad Quli Khan, encouraged Prince Ali Gauhar (later Emperor Shah Alam II), the fugitive heir to the Mughal throne, to launch a campaign to reclaim eastern territories from rebel control. Upon the Prince’s arrival at Jhusi on January 23, 1759, Balwant Singh paid homage, pledged 200,000 rupees to fund the expedition, and received a robe of honour from the Prince. Although Balwant Singh did not join the march eastward, he initiated troop recruitment within his domain. Following the failure of the expedition, Ali Gauhar retreated through Benares in late June 1759. Balwant Singh extended civil hospitality and offered assistance approximately 10 miles outside Benares.

Entrapment of Muhammed Quli Khan (1759)

While Muhammed Quli Khan and Prince Ali Gauhar were engaged in operations in Bihar, Shuja-ud-Daula, the Nawab of Awadh, seized the fort at Allahabad. In response, Quli Khan abandoned the Bihar campaign on March 23 to recover Allahabad. Shuja-ud-Daula instructed Beni Bahadur and Balwant Singh to intercept Quli Khan at Sarai Sayyid Razi. Balwant Singh secretly assured Quli Khan of non-aggression, indicating he could pass unhindered. Upon Quli Khan's arrival at Ramnagar, armed forces acting under Balwant Singh surrounded and looted him, leaving him to escape with a reduced entourage.

Confrontation with Shuja-ud-Daula (1761)

In May 1761, Shuja-ud-Daula marched toward Benares, ostensibly to assist Shah Alam II, but primarily intending to subdue Balwant Singh. Expecting an attack, Balwant Singh retreated to the surrounding hills along with his family and wealth. Resisting attempts by Shuja-ud-Daula and mediator Beni Bahadur to coax him out, Balwant Singh dispatched a representative, Lal Khan, with a nazrana (tribute) of 120,000 rupees. Accepting the tribute, the Nawab subsequently withdrew his forces from Benares.

Balwant Singh and The East India Company

Relations with Mir Qasim

Following his expulsion from Bengal by the East India Company in 1763, Mir Qasim sought Balwant Singh's support. In November 1763, he personally entered Balwant Singh's territory near the Ganges, accompanied by large quantities of treasure, including gold, jewels, and other valuables. Balwant Singh reportedly exploited Mir Qasim's vulnerable position by permitting organized plundering of his baggage by "licensed thieves." Although Mir Qasim protested, Balwant Singh offered only vague assurances and took no effective action to recover the stolen property.

Despite this treatment, Balwant Singh continued to render limited assistance to Mir Qasim. In January 1764 he sent approximately 200 cavalry, together with infantry companies under Jamadar Shaikh Ismail Beg, to escort Mir Qasim's treasure convoy toward Rohtasgarh. His forces also supplied laborers and transport for the movement of the treasure. The English, however, were unable to intercept these operations because the convoy deliberately avoided routes under Company observation. These actions demonstrated that Balwant Singh remained willing to aid Mir Qasim while avoiding direct confrontation with the Company.

Assistance to the Deserters from Mir Jafar's Army

In February 1764, approximately 150 European soldiers, together with Indian sepoys from the army of Mir Jafar, deserted over arrears of pay and entered Balwant Singh's territory under the French officer Madec. Company officer Captain Jennings requested Balwant Singh's assistance in securing their return.

Although Balwant Singh assured Jennings that he would make every effort to recover the deserters, he instead provided them with money, guides, and safe passage to the court of Shuja-ud-Daula. The Secret Committee at Fort William warned him that sheltering the deserters threatened Anglo-Benares relations, but these representations proved ineffective, and the deserters safely reached Awadh.

Contemporary British officials regarded this episode as a deliberate attempt by Balwant Singh to strengthen ties with Shuja-ud-Daula at the expense of the East India Company. His conduct contributed to a noticeable deterioration in political relations between the Nawab-Wazir and the Company.

Negotiations with the Nawab of Bengal

In March 1764, as relations between the Company and Shuja-ud-Daula worsened, Company commander Major John Carnac recommended cultivating Balwant Singh as a counterweight to Awadh. He proposed establishing a military magazine at Buxar, strengthening communications across the Karmanasa River, and seeking Balwant Singh's friendship despite previous tensions between Benares and Bengal.

At the same time, independent negotiations were taking place between Balwant Singh and Mir Jafar, the restored Nawab of Bengal. According to contemporary accounts, Balwant Singh expressed dissatisfaction with the Nawab of Awadh and showed willingness to align with Bengal.

On 18 March 1764, after extensive negotiations, Balwant Singh agreed in principle to enter into an alliance with Mir Jafar. The proposed arrangement provided that: Benares, Chunar, and territories held from Shuja-ud-Daula would be granted to Balwant Singh as a hereditary jagir.

The agreement would receive the endorsement of Major Carnac on behalf of the East India Company. Because of the urgency of the military situation, Carnac approved the arrangement without waiting for authorization from Fort William. Shortly afterward, the Secret Committee formally endorsed his decision, resolving to maintain Balwant Singh as an independent ruler and to regard him as an important defensive barrier protecting Bengal from future invasions.

Crisis Following the Arrival of Shuja-ud-Daula

The newly negotiated alliance was immediately tested. On 20 March 1764, Mir Qasim and Beni Bahadur, deputy of Shuja-ud-Daula, arrived near Benares with a large army, soon joined by Shuja-ud-Daula himself and the Mughal emperor Shah Alam II. Their combined forces advanced to Baluaghat on the Ganges.

Balwant Singh withdrew with his family and movable property to the strong fortress of Latifpur, avoiding immediate contact with the Nawab-Wazir. Acting on advice from trusted advisers, he eventually sent Lal Khan to negotiate. Although repeated assurances of safety were offered, Balwant Singh remained reluctant to leave his fortified position.

Only after further guarantees from Beni Bahadur, several senior Awadh commanders, and Nurul Hasan Khan Bilgrami, the Nawab's local representative at Benares, did Balwant Singh agree to appear before Shuja-ud-Daula. He attended the Nawab's camp with an imposing escort of approximately 2,000–3,000 cavalry and several thousand infantry, paying formal respects while carefully preserving his own military strength.

Secret Understanding with the East India Company

The circumstances surrounding Balwant Singh's meeting with Shuja-ud-Daula have attracted differing historical interpretations. One contemporary account suggests that his attendance reflected genuine reconciliation with the Nawab. Another interpretation, supported by British correspondence, argues that Balwant Singh had already entered into a confidential understanding with the East India Company before joining the Nawab's camp.

According to this interpretation, Balwant Singh maintained outward loyalty to his suzerain while secretly cooperating with the Company. Major Carnac himself later accused him of "double-dealing," suggesting that Balwant Singh deliberately cultivated both sides to preserve his own political position.

Influence on Carnac's Campaign

Balwant Singh's ambiguous conduct significantly affected British military planning. Carnac believed that the Raja's apparent alliance with the Company would induce Shuja-ud-Daula to delay offensive operations while attempting to secure his cooperation. Instead, Balwant Singh remained with the Nawab-Wazir's forces without openly supporting either side.

Carnac later concluded that Balwant Singh's behavior formed part of a coordinated strategy intended to lure the British army deeper into hostile territory and expose it to attack. Modern interpretations, however, suggest that Carnac misunderstood Balwant Singh's objectives. Rather than actively deceiving the British, Balwant Singh appears to have been pursuing a policy designed primarily to safeguard Benares by avoiding irrevocable commitment until the balance of power became clear.

Unable to rely confidently upon Balwant Singh, Carnac abandoned offensive operations, withdrew toward Patna on 4 April 1764, and justified the retreat on strategic grounds, including supply shortages and uncertainty regarding Balwant Singh's allegiance.

Participation in the Awadh Campaign

On 8 April 1764, the Mughal emperor, Shuja-ud-Daula, and Mir Qasim resumed their advance toward Patna. By 23 April, Balwant Singh had joined the allied army at Daudnagar with approximately 2,000 cavalry and 5,000 infantry.

Despite this contribution, his presence proved troublesome for the Nawab-Wazir. Contemporary sources record frequent complaints that Balwant Singh's followers engaged in widespread theft throughout the allied camp, creating friction between his forces and those of Awadh. Consequently, his alliance brought Shuja-ud-Daula more inconvenience than military advantage.

When the combined army fought the British at Panch Pahari on 3 May 1764, Balwant Singh occupied a position on the left wing of the allied line but took no active part in the engagement. The battle ended in defeat for Shuja-ud-Daula, and Balwant Singh likewise remained largely inactive during the subsequent operations around Patna.

Historical assessment

The events of 1763–1764 demonstrate Balwant Singh's sophisticated political strategy. Rather than committing himself unconditionally to either the East India Company or the Nawab of Awadh, he consistently shifted his position according to changing military and diplomatic circumstances. He alternately assisted Mir Qasim, negotiated with Mir Jafar and the Company, maintained formal loyalty to Shuja-ud-Daula, and avoided decisive participation in military engagements. This policy enabled him to preserve the autonomy of Benares during one of the most volatile periods in northern Indian politics, even as the East India Company emerged as the dominant power after the campaigns culminating in the Battle of Buxar later in 1764.

Neutrality during the Patna Campaign

After joining the allied army under Shuja-ud-Daula in April 1764 with approximately 2,000 cavalry and 5,000 infantry, Balwant Singh contributed little to the military campaign against the East India Company. During operations around Patna, he remained largely inactive, participating only in the artillery bombardment of the city on 13 May 1764, when his troops fired ineffective volleys against the fortifications.

His continued reluctance to engage in active combat aroused the suspicions of Shuja-ud-Daula, who ordered him to cross the Ganges and station his forces in the district of Ghazipur, opposite Buxar, thereby placing him under closer supervision.

British Attempts to Secure His Alliance

Despite Balwant Singh's formal association with the invading coalition, the authorities at Fort William did not abandon hopes of winning him over. On 10 May 1764, Major John Carnac dispatched troops across the Ganges into Ghazipur with two principal objectives: to encourage Balwant Singh to openly join the British cause and to disrupt Shuja-ud-Daula's communications and supply lines.

A detachment under Champion occupied Ghazipur in June 1764 and conducted extensive operations that severely damaged the surrounding countryside. Hundreds of villages were devastated and large quantities of grain were destroyed. These attacks contributed to Shuja-ud-Daula's eventual withdrawal from the region.

Significantly, Balwant Singh made no attempt to oppose the British incursions into his own dominions. Instead, he remained a passive observer while Company forces ravaged territory under his authority, reinforcing British perceptions that he was unwilling to commit himself wholeheartedly to the Nawab-Wazir's cause.

Conduct during the Battle of Buxar

Even during the decisive campaign culminating in the Battle of Buxar on 23 October 1764, Balwant Singh deliberately avoided active participation. He remained at the village of Aamia in the Muhammadabad pargana of Ghazipur with his contingent of 2,000 cavalry and 5,000 infantry, claiming illness as the reason for his absence from the battlefield.

His conspicuous neutrality attracted considerable contemporary comment. Some observers alleged that Company officials or the Bengal administration had secretly encouraged him to abandon Shuja-ud-Daula. Mir Ashraf, for example, accused Maharaja Nandakumar of persuading Balwant Singh to support the British. However, subsequent investigations by senior East India Company officials failed to substantiate these allegations.

The author instead concludes that Balwant Singh's conduct stemmed from broader strategic considerations rather than clandestine British influence. Since Shuja-ud-Daula could reach British-controlled Bengal only by passing through Benares, Balwant Singh could not prudently provoke his powerful suzerain by openly joining the Company before the outcome of the conflict became clear. Like many eighteenth-century Indian rulers, he therefore remained on the sidelines, waiting to support whichever side ultimately emerged victorious.

Alignment with the Victorious British

Following the Company's victory at Buxar, Balwant Singh rapidly adjusted his political position. The Mughal Emperor Shah Alam II, now effectively freed from Shuja-ud-Daula's control, congratulated Major Hector Munro on the victory and sent presents through Balwant Singh's representative, Suchit Ram, thereby acknowledging British supremacy.

As British forces advanced into Benares in early November 1764, Munro imposed strict discipline upon his troops, forbidding plunder and attempting to reassure the city's inhabitants. Although many residents initially fled in fear, confidence gradually returned under British occupation.

British Policy toward Benares

The victory at Buxar transformed British policy toward Benares. Fort William decided that the province should remain under Company control and that its revenues should be employed for Company purposes. Officials considered this preferable to restoring the territory to Shuja-ud-Daula, whom they accused of exploiting it merely to augment his income.

On 6 November 1764, the Bengal Government instructed Munro to demand from Shuja-ud-Daula the cession of: all territory north of the Ganges, the city of Benares, the fortress of Chunar, and adjoining districts.

At the same time, British officials expressed considerable distrust of Balwant Singh. Correspondence from Fort William observed that his "double part" during the war had destroyed confidence in his loyalty. If he had not already entered into negotiations with the Company, Munro was authorized to dispossess him of his territories and assume direct responsibility for revenue administration.

To facilitate this policy, the Bengal Government established an East India Company factory at Benares on 26 November 1764, appointing Randolf Marriott as its chief.

Balwant Singh's Submission to the Company

Recognizing the irreversible change in the political situation, Balwant Singh acted swiftly to reconcile himself with the British. After withdrawing from Amla to Ramnagar, and subsequently taking refuge in the fortress of Latifpur upon Munro's arrival in Benares, he opened negotiations with Company officials. He cultivated influential intermediaries, including:

Raja Khayali Ram,

Nurul Hasan Khan,

Raja Shitab Rai - Deputy Governor of Bihar.

Balwant Singh sent congratulatory gifts, including eleven gold mohurs, to Governor Henry Vansittart and wrote expressing his loyalty and willingness to accept any settlement proposed by the British. He similarly dispatched gifts to Munro and emphasized his faithful obedience.

Even before Munro entered Benares, Balwant Singh had inquired whether the Company intended to retain possession of the conquered territories. If so, he proposed that he be confirmed as administrator (zamindar) not only of Benares but also of Ghazipur, Jaunpur, Bijaygarh, and the management of Azamgarh. He later offered to pay an annual revenue estimated at 24 lakhs of rupees, together with an additional monthly payment, in return for recognition of these claims.

Raja Shitab Rai strongly recommended Balwant Singh's proposals to Munro, describing him as a trustworthy frontier chief who fulfilled his financial obligations punctually. Shah Alam II likewise suggested that British support for Balwant Singh would facilitate the conquest of Chunargarh and Allahabad by undermining Shuja-ud-Daula's remaining authority.

Munro's Response

Despite these overtures, Munro remained cautious. Although he refrained from immediately dispossessing Balwant Singh, he also declined to grant him formal confirmation of his territories until the war had been conclusively settled. Munro informed the Raja that his lands would remain temporarily in his possession pending the conclusion of peace.

Balwant Singh, however, refused to leave the security of Latifpur unless Munro first supplied him with a properly executed treaty guaranteeing his rights.

Munro was reluctant to prolong the dispute. Although the Company had won at Buxar, Shuja-ud-Daula still commanded a substantial army estimated at 30,000 troops, had rejected British demands for surrender, and continued to pose a serious military threat. Furthermore, widespread insecurity around Benares complicated revenue collection and required considerable military resources. Under these circumstances, the British preferred negotiation with Balwant Singh to immediate confrontation.

Historical assessment

The events of 1764 illustrate Balwant Singh's characteristic style of statecraft. Throughout the campaign he consistently avoided decisive military commitments, preserving his forces while waiting for the balance of power to become evident. His outward loyalty to Shuja-ud-Daula, combined with discreet communications with the East India Company, reflected a deliberate strategy aimed at safeguarding the political autonomy of Benares rather than ideological attachment to either side.

Although contemporary British officials repeatedly condemned his "double-dealing," the evidence presented in these excerpts suggests that his conduct was primarily dictated by geopolitical necessity. As ruler of a strategically situated frontier state lying between Awadh and Bengal, Balwant Singh sought above all to ensure the survival of his principality. Once the Company's victory at Buxar established British predominance in northern India, he quickly abandoned neutrality, sought British protection, and negotiated to retain his hereditary authority under the emerging colonial order. This pragmatic adaptation laid the foundations for the subsequent relationship between the Benares Raj and the East India Company during the later 1760s and 1770s.

In November 1764, Munro accepted Balwant Singh's proposals after they were conveyed through Raja Suchit Ram. On 21 November, he formally agreed to the Raja's terms and dispatched Captain Stables with the signed treaty articles, while Munir-ud-Daula was sent to reassure Balwant Singh on Munro's behalf. Balwant Singh arrived at Benares on 24 November, where Munro confirmed him in possession of all the territories he then held from the Nawab-Wazir. The settlement was made on the existing basis of his tenure, allowing him to retain effective control over his dominions.

Munro later admitted in a letter to the Secret Committee (22 November 1764) that he had little practical alternative. He observed that if anyone other than Balwant Singh were entrusted with revenue collection or assistance to the Mughal emperor, the Company would have needed to maintain a much larger army. He further acknowledged that without a substantial cavalry force he could neither safely besiege Chunar nor advance upon Allahabad while Balwant Singh remained hostile. In another passage, Munro described the agreement as a "lucky circumstance," stating that expelling Balwant Singh would have required crossing the Ganges twice and would have prevented operations against Chunar or Allahabad. These remarks amounted to an acknowledgment that British military necessities, rather than generosity, dictated the compromise.

The agreement proved immediately advantageous to the East India Company. Balwant Singh paid the first installment of seven lakh rupees demanded by Munro and advised the British to attack the strategically important fortress of Chunar. British operations against Chunar commenced on 2 December 1764 under Captain Pemble but were abandoned five days later after Shuja-ud-Daula advanced with approximately 17,000 troops, threatening British communications and attempting to carry off the Mughal emperor.

The arrangement, however, soon encountered political complications. After learning of Munro's settlement, the Company's Secret Committee approved the agreement with Balwant Singh but argued that the Raja's authority should ultimately derive from the Company rather than from the Mughal emperor or the Nawab of Awadh. The Committee proposed that Balwant Singh's zamindari, together with the districts of Ghazipur and surrounding territories, should be vested directly in the Company, with all revenues collected in its name. Acting upon this policy, Emperor Shah Alam II issued a farman on 29 December 1764 assigning the country of Ghazipur and the remainder of Balwant Singh's zamindari to the East India Company. The Raja of Benares was thereafter instructed to pay his revenues directly to the Company instead of the Nawab.

Balwant Singh regarded the imperial farman as a breach of the earlier understanding reached with Munro. He had joined the British on the expectation that his possessions would be secured under his own authority, but instead found that the emperor had transferred his territories to the Company. Deeply disappointed, he withdrew from the British camp under the pretext of protecting his family from a possible attack by Shuja-ud-Daula. British officials soon reported that the arrangement was deteriorating. Although the Raja had paid the initial installment of seven lakh rupees, by early January 1765 he had remitted only about ₹900,000 from the current revenue collections and had taken no further action. Reports also reached Fort William that Balwant Singh had deserted the British army, though the Bengal government initially treated these reports with skepticism.

Neutrality after the Battle of Buxar

In January 1765, Company officials remained uncertain of Balwant Singh's intentions. Major Fletcher informed the Secret Council that the Raja could not be relied upon and feared that he sympathized more with Nawab Shuja-ud-Daula than with the Company. These concerns proved unfounded. Although Balwant Singh declined to participate actively in British military operations, he also refrained from any hostile action against the Company. Contemporary British officials regarded him as essentially neutral, despite repeated efforts to persuade him to rejoin the British camp. His neutrality stemmed from the continuing strength of Shuja-ud-Daula, who still controlled the important fortresses of Chunar and Allahabad and retained significant military resources.

Even after Fletcher captured Jaunpur on 21 January 1765, predictions that Balwant Singh would immediately support the Company were not fulfilled. Emperor Shah Alam II urged him to assist British operations against Chunar and Allahabad, but Balwant Singh deliberately withheld military assistance. British observers described him as maintaining a "sphinx-like" silence, waiting until his own political and territorial interests were adequately safeguarded before committing himself.

Negotiations with the East India Company

By early February 1765, the Company's military situation had become increasingly difficult. Operations against Shuja-ud-Daula were hampered by financial shortages, soldiers had gone unpaid for several months, and the British urgently required local support. Shitab Rai therefore negotiated directly with Balwant Singh at Latifpur to remove his apprehensions and secure his cooperation.

On 6 February 1765, a formal agreement was concluded between the Company and Balwant Singh. Signed on behalf of the Company by Major Fletcher and Marriott, the treaty confirmed Balwant Singh in possession of four sarkars under Company authority. This settlement ended the immediate political uncertainty and enabled the British to proceed with renewed military operations against Shuja-ud-Daula.

Military Cooperation

After the agreement, Balwant Singh actively assisted the Company's campaign. His brother led a contingent of troops in support of the British assault on Allahabad, while his nephew Samir Singh served under Captain Stibbert during the siege of Chunar. The fort of Chunar fell on 8 February 1765, and Allahabad surrendered later the same day.

The alliance benefited both parties. British military operations resumed without interference from Benares, while Balwant Singh was able to restore order within his own territories. Disorder created by rebellious zamindars in Ghazipur and widespread disturbances around Jaunpur had weakened revenue collection, but the British alliance enabled him to concentrate on restoring administration while Company troops supported the suppression of resistance.

Administrative Settlement

Following the military successes, detailed administrative arrangements were finalized between Balwant Singh and the Company. The Raja agreed not to interfere with Company revenue collection, while Marriott was appointed to supervise the regular payment of land revenue.

The annual revenue assessment of the four sarkars was fixed at Rs. 20,86,607. After deductions for customary assignments (fymally and nankars), the net assessment stood at Rs. 18,70,807. Balwant Singh's own revenue demand was ultimately fixed at approximately Rs. 16,42,500, subject to later revision by the authorities at Fort William. He was also required to make an annual instalment of Rs. 1,36,875.

The settlement formally entrusted Balwant Singh with responsibility for maintaining law and order within the four sarkars, including the strategically important fort of Chunar. In addition to his existing functions as amin and faujdar, he requested several guarantees from the Company: protection from interference in the discharge of his official duties; authority over the management of Seringah (essential for collecting Ghazipur revenues); the assignment of a battalion with artillery to assist revenue collection; and assurance that no additional revenue demands would be imposed beyond the agreed assessment.

British Distrust

Despite the agreement, the authorities at Fort William remained deeply suspicious of Balwant Singh. They feared that his strategic position between British-controlled Bengal and the territories of Shuja-ud-Daula made him capable of threatening Company communications if he chose to abandon the alliance. Governor John Carnac observed in April 1765 that Balwant Singh had returned to the British side only because the Company had honored its promises, and he advised constant surveillance of the Raja's conduct. British officials acknowledged Balwant Singh's political flexibility, describing him as a ruler who consistently placed his own interests above ideological or diplomatic commitments. Nevertheless, they concluded that maintaining his loyalty was essential for the security of the Company's north-western frontier. Consequently, Fort William accepted nearly all of his demands and confirmed him as the zamindar of Benares with extensive privileges, hoping that continued concessions would secure his lasting allegiance.

Their anxieties intensified in April 1765 following the flight of Beni Bahadur, when Company officials feared that Balwant Singh might exploit the instability to rebel. Instructions were issued to monitor him closely and adopt every precaution necessary for British security.

Consolidation of the Alliance

Contrary to British fears, Balwant Singh remained faithful to the agreement. He began making regular payments of tribute (kists) to the Company and offered no opposition to British military operations. His cooperation enabled the Company to finance its campaign against Shuja-ud-Daula, culminating in the Nawab's defeat at the Battle of Kora (3 May 1765).

John Carnac subsequently reported that Balwant Singh had become a valuable ally and argued that the extensive territories of Benares and Ghazipur were too important for the Company to administer directly. Instead, he recommended leaving them under Balwant Singh's control in exchange for financial payments. The Court of Directors likewise encouraged a moderate settlement with Shuja-ud-Daula and endorsed Carnac's conciliatory approach, although it rejected proposals to transfer Balwant Singh's zamindari to the Nawab of Awadh.

By mid-1765, Balwant Singh had emerged as one of the Company's most significant regional allies in northern India. His careful diplomacy preserved the autonomy of Benares while simultaneously enabling the East India Company to consolidate its military and political position in the aftermath of the Battle of Buxar.

Treaty of Allahabad and Confirmation of the Zamindari

During negotiations leading to the Treaty of Allahabad, Company officials rejected proposals to restore Balwant Singh's zamindari directly to Shuja-ud-Daula. Instead, they instructed Robert Clive to ensure that the Raja remained in possession of Benares while simultaneously reconciling the Nawab. The Select Committee reaffirmed this policy on 21 June 1765, emphasizing that Balwant Singh should be secured in the zamindari of Benares. The Treaty of Allahabad, concluded on 16 August 1765, fundamentally altered the political status of Balwant Singh without immediately affecting his authority. Under the treaty: Shuja-ud-Daula recovered all his dominions except Chunar. Kora and Allahabad were transferred to Emperor Shah Alam II. The Nawab agreed to pay fifty lakh rupees as war indemnity. Most importantly, Shuja-ud-Daula solemnly guaranteed Balwant Singh's possession of Benares, Ghazipur, and all districts under his control, provided that the Raja continued to pay the same annual revenue as before. Although Balwant Singh had previously been under Company protection, the treaty transferred his allegiance and obligations back to the Nawab of Awadh. Contemporary observers regarded this as merely a change of political overlord rather than a loss of authority. It was generally believed that the arrangement would continue only until late November 1765, after which Shuja-ud-Daula expected to resume complete sovereignty over Benares.

British Assessment of Balwant Singh

Later British writers occasionally portrayed Company policy as an expression of gratitude toward Balwant Singh for supporting the British cause. The contemporary evidence, however, suggests a different interpretation.

The Company had originally intended to depose Balwant Singh after the Battle of Buxar. Only changing military and political circumstances forced British officials to negotiate with him. Balwant Singh himself dictated many of the conditions of his settlement, compelling the Company to recognize his authority because of his strategic importance.

The principal reason for British support lay in frontier security. Company officials believed that Benares should function as a buffer state between British-controlled Bihar and the territories of Awadh. Shitab Rai summarized this policy by arguing that Balwant Singh's zamindari should remain under Company protection because its geographical position would make it valuable to the English in times of military necessity.

Robert Clive likewise considered the settlement prudent. British correspondence described the preservation of Balwant Singh's authority as advantageous because a friendly Hindu ruler on the frontier could restrain the ambitions of the Nawab of Awadh.

Administrative Reforms under British Protection

During 1765, Company representative Marriott undertook a detailed investigation of grievances within Balwant Singh's territories. Many Muslim landholders holding revenue-free grants under earlier royal patronage complained that they had been compelled by Balwant Singh to pay assessments like ordinary cultivators, while others alleged that they had been dispossessed of their estates.

Marriott examined these claims during July 1765. After reviewing petitions submitted by religious institutions, charitable pensioners, and holders of royal grants, he recognized 323 individuals and families as legitimate beneficiaries. An annual pension totaling Rs. 91,002-14 annas was sanctioned for them, to be paid by Balwant Singh.

These measures attempted to regularize revenue administration while preserving older royal privileges.

Conflicts with Company Officials

Administrative affairs in Benares were complicated by disputes involving Marriott, Company officer Bolts, Emperor Shah Alam II, and the Nawab of Awadh.

Marriott secured from Shah Alam the office of mint-master and shared its profits with the Emperor, a decision that attracted criticism within Company circles. Bolts accused Marriott before the Select Committee of illegally exercising the offices of amin, faujdar, and kotwal, contrary to Company instructions.

Simultaneously, Shuja-ud-Daula complained that Marriott was interfering in the Nawab's administration, particularly regarding the mint, and behaving as though he exercised sovereign authority.

In response, the Bengal Government ordered Marriott in October 1765 to refrain from direct interference in provincial administration and to confine himself exclusively to collecting the tankhwah payments due under the treaty. Although subsequent investigations criticized Marriott for exceeding his authority, the Bengal Government acknowledged his previous services and treated him with relative leniency. Bolts also received official censure.

Interestingly, despite occasional disagreements with Marriott, Balwant Singh praised his administration and strongly supported his continuation in Benares.

Relations with the Nawab of Awadh

Balwant Singh sought unsuccessfully to persuade the Company to transfer the strategically important fort of Chunar to his control. The Bengal Government rejected the proposal because it conflicted with the Treaty of Allahabad but assured the Raja that it would continue supporting his legitimate interests.

In May 1766, after Shuja-ud-Daula completed payment of the treaty indemnity, Company officers formally restored Benares to Awadh administration. Isaac Sage installed the Nawab's government in the province on 1 July 1766, while Chunar Fort was transferred to Awadh under the condition that an English battalion would remain stationed there for defensive purposes.

The Nawab nevertheless remained dissatisfied with Balwant Singh's privileged position under British protection. During the Chapra Conference (June 1766), Shuja-ud-Daula requested Robert Clive's permission to remove the Raja and demanded: an increase of ten lakh rupees in annual revenue; and payment of an additional thirty lakh rupees as pesh-kash.